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This paper discusses the public finances of the 10 new EU Countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe, with particular emphasis on the ef-
fects of the global financial crisis that started in 2008. The budget out-
comes have differed markedly across the new EU countries, both before 
and during the crisis. The direct impact of the crisis on public finances 
was limited, but the severe downturns have strained public finances and 
increased debt ratios considerably. Estimations of budget reaction func-
tions reveal that the budget balance has, in general, been moderately 
counter-cyclical, but also that the counter-cyclicality derives entirely 
from the revenue side. The medium-term fiscal outlook rests, to a large 
extent,  on  growth  prospects. The  uncertainties  regarding  future  eco-
nomic growth and stability in financial markets suggest that several of 
the new EU countries need to tighten fiscal policies as a medium-term 
prudential measure. 
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Non-technical summary 
 
This paper discusses the development of the public finances in the 10 new 
EU  Countries  from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  since  the  global  financial 
crisis broke out in 2008. The first-round effect of the financial crisis was a 
“flight to quality”, where investors shunned non-prime financial assets. This 
led to a sharp retrenchment of capital flows to the new EU countries resulting 
in  much  tighter  borrowing  conditions  for  households,  individuals  and  the 
public sector. The second-round effect was deep downturns in the real econ-
omy as export demand as well as domestic consumption and investment de-
mand contracted.   
The crisis has opened up a fundamental dilemma regarding the public fi-
nances. On the one hand, the crisis calls for more government intervention in 
the economy with the aim to curb the downturn, save jobs and reduce social 
problems. On the other hand, it has exposed the government’s fiscal vulnera-
bility, which constrains the possibilities of the public sector playing an active 
role in the economy. The implication is that the global financial crisis poses 
considerable challenges to the management of public finances in the new EU 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
The immediate effect of the financial crisis on public finances in the 10 
new EU countries was an impediment to government borrowing. Credit De-
fault Swap spreads shot up as financial markets demanded higher prices for 
taking on risks and revised upwards the risk assessment estimates. Facing 
imminent financing problems, Hungary and Latvia had to turn to the IMF in 
autumn 2008; Romania followed suit at the beginning of 2009.  
The direct budgetary costs of the financial crisis have been modest, except 
in Latvia where a domestic bank was bailed out in the autumn 2008. Else-
where the mainly foreign-owned banks and financial institutions have been 
kept afloat by their owners. The impact of the global financial crisis on the 
fiscal situation has, thus, primarily been indirect via the effect on revenues 
and spending of lower economic growth, increased unemployment, etc.  
Given the growth setback, it is unsurprising that fiscal balances deterio-
rated in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, but there are substantial 
differences across the 10 new EU countries. Four different country clusters 
can be identified based on their fiscal performance in 2009. The casualties 
comprise Latvia, Hungary and Romania, which had to turn to the IMF for 
support and which subsequently have directed their fiscal policies towards 
satisfying the loan conditionalities. The activists include the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, which have followed relatively expansionary 
policies to counter-act the effect of the crisis. The hardliners are Bulgaria and 
Estonia, which have maintained a tight fiscal stance in spite of considerable   3 
downturns. Finally, the outlier refers to Lithuania, which has managed to fi-
nance substantial deficits during the crisis without having to turn to the IMF.  
The estimations of budget reaction functions reveal that the overall general 
budget balance has been moderately counter-cyclical, but also that this coun-
ter-cyclicality derives entirely from the revenue side. The estimations suggest 
that if the global financial crisis has, on average, caused a reduction of output 
growth in the new EU countries equal to 10 percentage points in 2009, then 
this output loss has entailed an average worsening of the budget balance by  
3 percentage points or more in 2009 and with substantial carry-over effects in 
the following years. 
The medium-term budget outlook rests to a large extent on the growth out-
look. If growth returns to pre-crisis levels, budget balances will improve rap-
idly and debt as a share of GDP will stabilise or fall. If the crisis is protracted 
and leads to low or zero growth in the medium term, budget deficits as a per-
centage of GDP will remain large and the financing of the debt may be in 
jeopardy. The budgetary situation is subject to substantial uncertain including 
a number of additional factors, which may affect the budget balance in nega-
tive direction.  
The upshot is that a number of the new EU countries would need to tight-
en fiscal policies in the medium-term in order to improve the budget balance 
and reduce financial vulnerabilities. Such an improvement of the structural 
balance is particularly pertinent, given the unsettled situation in world finan-
cial and goods markets. A more counter-cyclical fiscal stance may also be 
beneficial, in part to ensure that a future upturn is used to consolidate public 
finances. In this context, it may be particularly important to consider steps 
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1. Introduction 
 
The epicentre of the global financial crisis was the American financial sec-
tor, where increasing strains during 2008 culminated in the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The global repercussions were immedi-
ate and severe. Financial markets throughout the world exhibited extreme in-
stability in the months following the bankruptcy. Private investment and con-
sumption contracted as financial intermediation broke down and uncertainty 
increased. Trade and manufacturing production went into freefall with the 
consequence  that  worldwide  economic  growth  turned  negative  in  the  first 
quarters  of  2009  and  unemployment  shot  up.  A  crisis  that  started  in  the 
American  financial  sector  had  become  a  worldwide  real-economy  crisis 
(IMF, 2009a, Ch. 1).  
The global financial crisis has seriously affected the 10 new EU members 
from Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, which joined in 2004, 
and  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  which  joined  in  2007.  Capital  inflows  to  the 
countries retrenched markedly already in 2008 resulting in tighter borrowing 
conditions  for  businesses,  individuals  and  the  public  sector.  Domestic  de-
mand contracted and export volumes fell with the consequence that all coun-
tries in the region experienced markedly lower GDP growth and increasing 
unemployment in 2009. 
This paper discusses the impact of the global financial crisis on public 
finances in the new EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe as well as 
the challenges stemming from the crisis in the short and medium term. The 
crisis has opened up a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, the crisis has 
increased the appeal for more government intervention in the economy with 
the aim to curb the downturn, save jobs and reduce social problems. On the 
other hand, it has exposed the government’s fiscal vulnerability, which con-
strains the possibilities of the public sector playing an active role in the econ-
omy. The implication is that the global financial crisis poses considerable 
challenges to the management of public finances in the new EU countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe. 
The impact and challenges of the financial crisis change over time. The 
short-term challenges unfolded in 2008–2009 and were essentially a question 
about adapting to the immediate fallout of the crisis, in particular increasing 
financing needs as GDP growth dropped combined with reduced liquidity in 
non-prime government debt markets. The medium-term challenges consist in 
devising policies which adequately address the demands stemming from in-
creased unemployment and a possible lower trend growth, while ensuring 
that fiscal sustainability is not compromised.   6 
The topic has been discussed in a number of publications from 2009; inter 
alia, Darvas (2009), EC (2009b, Part I, Ch. 2), EC (2009d), IMF (2009b), 
IMF (2009c) and WB (2009a, Ch. 1). The contribution of this paper is mainly 
its regional focus on the 10 new EU countries from Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, its use of budget reaction functions and its broad discussion, including 
fiscal management issues. 
At this stage it is worth bringing up two limitations of this paper. First, the 
global financial crisis spread across the world with fundamental changes un-
folding at alarming speed. This implies that any analysis of the crisis and its 
effects may be made obsolete in a short time. Second, we generally use con-
solidated data for the general government and do discuss the performance of 
different levels and budgetary units of government. This choice saves space, 
but is also based on the reasoning that although local governments and other 
budgetary entities play important roles in the public sectors in all 10 new EU 
countries, the central government ultimately have the authority to determine 
overall expenditure and revenue levels. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives background 
information on the size, role and management of the government sector in the 
new EU countries. Section 3 discusses the impact of the global financial cri-
sis on the economies of the new EU countries. Section 4 presents data on the 
immediate fiscal response to the crisis. Section 5 estimates budget reactions 
based on data from 1995 to 2008 to assess the reaction to, inter alia, cyclical 
shocks. Section 6 discusses the medium-term fiscal policy challenges. Final-
ly, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The public sector in the new EU countries  
 
Beyond sharing their geographical position in Central and Eastern Europe 
and a communist past, the new EU countries are relatively heterogeneous. 
The size of the population varies from more than 38 million inhabitants in 
Poland to less than 1.4 million in Estonia at the beginning of 2009. The per 
capita income levels range from approximately 30 percent of the EU15 aver-
age in Bulgaria to 80 percent of the EU15 average in Slovenia when taken as 
averages during 2006–2008 (Eurostat, 2009a, own calculations).  
As regards the public sector in the new EU countries, Figure 1 shows a 
cross plot of the purchasing power adjusted GDP level and the general gov-
ernment expenditures as a percent of GDP in 26 EU countries (Luxembourg 
is excluded) taken as averages for 2006-08.
1 
                                                 
1 Figure 1 is based on averages for the three years 2006 to 2008 of GDP per capita and 







30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130




























































Figure 1: Relative per capita GDP and government expenditures as percent of 
GDP in the EU countries, averages 2006–2008 
Note: Luxembourg is not included. 




Three main observations follow from Figure 1. First, on average the public 
sectors are relatively small in the new EU countries compared to most West 
European EU countries, although there is substantial variability across the 10 
new EU countries. Second, as illustrated by the trendline, there is a clear pos-
itive correlation between income level and government size; the 10 new EU 
countries are no exception in this respect. Third, there is substantial variation 
in the size of governments across countries with broadly similar income lev-
el. Among the new EU countries the Baltic States and Slovakia stand out, 
having smaller public sectors than would be expected given the income level, 
while Poland and in particular Hungary have larger public sectors than would 
be expected.  
The different government sizes in the new EU countries partly reflect dif-
ferent economic and social models across the 10 countries (Fenger, 2007; 
Kogan et al., 2008). The Baltic countries adopted at an early stage of the tran-
sition process an economic model based on openness, low taxes and relative-
                                                                                                                              
perienced substantial GDP falls in 2009, which were not followed by corresponding reduc-
tions in government expenditures. The upshot would be that a similar figure for 2009 would 
entail some changes in the relative position of the countries.     8 
ly basic provisioning of education, health and social welfare. Variations of 
this economic and social model were adopted by Slovakia, Bulgaria and Ro-
mania at later stages of the transition process, often following economic and/ 
or political crises.  
The Central European countries Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovenia have relatively large public sectors, with public expenditures around 
or above the level that could be expected based on the income level. These 
countries have generally maintained a more predominant role of the govern-
ment and relatively generous pensions, unemployment insurance and social 
subsidies. Hungary stands out with its very large government expenditures as 
a share of GDP, in part reflecting substantial interest payments from accumu-
lated government liabilities.  
Table 1 shows the dynamics of the gross debt of the general government 
in each of the 10 new EU countries as well as the average in old EU15 coun-
tries from 1995 to 2008. The debt levels in most of the new EU countries 
have been relatively moderate compared to the EU15 average, with the ex-
ception of Hungary.  
Many  of  the  countries  entered  the  post-communist  period  in  the  early 
1990s with limited government debt. The exceptions were Poland, Hungary 
and Bulgaria. Poland rescheduled its debt (and received substantial debt re-
lief) in the early 1990s. Hungary opted not to restructure its debt from the 
communist period, but nevertheless saw its debt as a share of GDP decline 
until the turn of the century. The debt grew markedly thereafter, increasing 
from around 50 percent of GDP in 2002 to more than 70 percent in 2008. 
Bulgaria underwent a very pronounced debt consolidation in from 1997 to 
2008, doubtless aided by a high rate of economic growth. 
In many respects, the government debt position in 2008 and the years be-
fore mirrors the government’s size of the individual countries. Poland and 
Hungary have the largest public sectors and the highest debt ratios in 2008, 
while the Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria have relatively small public 
sectors and the lowest debt ratios.  
The overall picture is that the fiscal position was fairly benign in most of 
the new EU members until 2008, i.e. until the outset of the global financial 
crisis. The size of the government in the countries has been restrained and 
kept in proportion to the income levels. Moreover, the government debt has 
been maintained at manageable levels. The main exception to this overall pic-
ture is Hungary, where expansionary fiscal policies from 2002 interrupted an 
ongoing debt consolidation and increased the size of the government sector.  
 
  
Table 1: Government consolidated gross debt in the new EU countries, percent of GDP, 1995–2008 
 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Bulgaria  ..  ..  105.1  79.6  79.3  74.3  67.3  53.6  45.9  37.9  29.2  22.7  18.2  14.1 
Czech Republic  14.6  12.5     13.1  15.0  16.4  18.5  25.1  28.5  30.1  30.4  29.7  29.4  29.0  30.0 
Estonia    9.0   7.4     6.2   5.5    6.0   5.2   4.8   5.7   5.6   5.0   4.6   4.5   3.8   4.6 
Latvia  15.1  13.9   11.1   9.6  12.5  12.3  14.0  13.5  14.6  14.9  12.4  10.7  9.0  19.5 
Lithuania  11.9  14.3   15.6  16.6  22.8  23.7  23.1  22.3  21.1  19.4  18.4  18.0  16.9  15.6 
Hungary  87.4  73.7   64.0  62.0  61.1  54.2  52.1  55.8  58.1  59.4  61.8  65.6  65.9  72.9 
Poland  49.0  43.4   42.9  38.9  39.6  36.8  37.6  42.2  47.1  45.7  47.1  47.7  45.0  47.2 
Romania    7.0  11.1   15.2  16.6  21.9  22.5  25.7  24.9  21.5  18.7  15.8  12.4  12.6  13.6 
Slovenia  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  26.8  28.0  27.5  27.8  27.0  26.7  23.3  22.5 
Slovakia  22.1  31.1   33.8  34.5  47.8  50.3  48.9  43.4  42.4  41.4  34.2  30.5  29.3  27.7 
EU15  ..  ..   69.9  68.1  67.2  63.2  62.2  61.6  63.0  63.3  64.1  62.8  60.4  .. 
Source: Eurostat (2009c).  
   10 
The relatively benign fiscal outcome is arguably the result of political pri-
orities in the 10 new EU countries. As mentioned above, there seems to be a 
link between the size of the government and the overall indebtedness. The 
outcome should, however, also be seen in light of the high trend growth in 
most of these countries since 1995 (c.f. also Section 3). High trend growth al-
lows for increasing real government expenditures, while maintaining the ex-
penditures as a share of GDP at moderate levels. High trend growth makes it 
easier to improve the fiscal balance and also contributes to a lower debt as a 
share of GDP by expanding the denominator.  
The institutional setup of fiscal policies and budgetary institutions in the 
new EU countries broadly follows the setup in the old EU15 countries. This 
stems from the fact that the applicant countries were obliged to satisfy all 
“chapters”  of  the  acquis  communautaire  as  part  of  the  requirements  for 
gaining membership of the EU. A number of the chapters of the fifth enlarge-
ment dealt with fiscal policies, taxation, financial control and budgetary pro-
visions (Daviddi and Ilzkovitz, 1997).
2 
Membership of the EU also implies that the fiscal policy outcome is sub-
ject to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which stipulates that the budget 
deficit must not exceed 3 percent of GDP and that the government debt must 
not exceed 60 percent of GDP or must be approaching that value. The Euro-
pean Commission monitors the performance of the individual EU countries 
and can initiate an Excessive Deficit Procedure in case a country is found to 
breach the limits of the SGP. The SGP was reformed in 2005 so that it be-
came explicit that the limits can be exceeded in a number of circumstances. 
The impact of the SGP on fiscal policy is uncertain, because a country ex-
ceeding the limits can allude to exceptional circumstances, and also because 
non-EMU members cannot be subjected to monetary penalties.
3 It has been 
argued, however, that the targets of the SGP have functioned as important 
navigation marks for the broad fiscal policy formulation in the new EU coun-
tries (Annett, 2006).  
The Maastricht Treaty posits a number of convergence criteria which must 
be satisfied for an EU country to qualify for membership of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The fiscal criterion stipulates that a 
country must not be subject to the excessive deficit produce. The effective-
ness of this institutional constraint on fiscal policy in the new EU countries 
                                                 
2 Studies suggest that the fiscal governance in the new EU countries improved markedly 
prior to the accession to the European Union, while less progress is discernable afterwards 
(Hallerberg and Ylaoutinen, 2008).  
3 Collignon (2006) finds that the SGP has had no discernible effect on the sustainability 
of public finances in the old EU countries, possibly because public finances were already on 
a sustainable path in all countries before the introduction of the SGP.   11 
outside the EMU evidently hinge on the priority given to EMU membership 
in the individual country and to which extent the country satisfies the other 
three requirements convergence criteria.  
Studies have shown that the fiscal outcome is influenced by the quality of 
the institutions, in which budget policies are formulated, decided and imple-
mented. Fabrizio and Mody (2008) have constructed indices depicting the 
quality of institutions regarding the three main phases of the fiscal policy-
making process, namely: i) the preparation of acts and regulations, ii) the 
legislative decision-making process (“authorisation”) and iii) the implemen-
tation of the decisions. The quality of the preparation and implementation in-
stitutions mainly reflects administrative and bureaucratic capabilities, while 
the authorisation measure also includes the political institutions and regula-
tory regime affecting the decision-making process.  
Indices for the fiscal policy quality are available for 23 out of the 27 EU 
countries for 1994 and 2003–2004. A higher index value indicates fiscal in-
stitutions of higher quality. The indices remain unchanged or increase for all 
10 new EU from 1994 to 2003–2004, although there is substantial variation 
across the countries. Figure 2 shows the three indices as well as their average, 
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Figure 2: Indices of quality of fiscal policy institutions, 2003–2004 
Note: EU15 denotes a simple average of the indices for the EU15 countries except France and 
Ireland. 
Source: Fabrizio and Mody (2008:17); own calculations.   12 
The indices of institutional fiscal policy quality do not differ markedly be-
tween the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe and the aver-
age of the old EU15 countries. Countries like Estonia, Poland and Romania 
generally attain high scores along all three components of fiscal governance 
and, consequently, also of the overall index of effectiveness. Hungary and 
Slovenia are in the other end of the spectrum and generally attain low scores. 
Interestingly, both Hungary and Latvia attain very low scores regarding the 
authorisation, i.e. the institutions regarding the political decision-making of 
fiscal policy measures.  
The picture of the fiscal institutions in the new EU countries being compa-
rable to or slightly less effective than in the old EU15 countries is in accord-
ance with the picture obtained if broader governance measures are consid-
ered. The World Bank collects data on, inter alia, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, the rule of law and control of corruption control (WB, 
2009b). The overall picture is that the best performing new EU countries 
have scores around the EU15 average, while the rest score below the EU15 
average but substantially above the levels attained by other post-communist 
countries (Darvas, 2009).  
 
3. The impact of the global financial crisis on the new 
EU countries 
 
The first-round effect of the collapse of Lehman Brothers was a “flight to 
quality”, which immediately led to extreme instability in financial markets 
across the world, including in the main markets in the USA and Western 
Europe (EC, 2009c). The second-round effect emerged already in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 as the financial crisis spread to the real economy. Private in-
vestment and consumption demand contracted as firms and households expe-
rienced capital losses, financing problems and increased uncertainty. Global 
trade volumes contracting significantly starting already in the fourth quarter 
2008. The resulting downturn in the world economy is of extraordinary pro-
portions. As a group the advanced economies, mainly in North America and 
Europe, attained barely positive economic growth in 2008 and are estimated 
to have attained growth of –3.4 percent in 2009 (IMF, 2009a, Ch. 1).  
The “flight to quality” immediately spilled over to credit markets in the 
new EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe, as investors shunned 
non-prime financial assets. Several governments faced borrowing problems 
(as discussed in more detail in Section 4), while many banks in the region 
saw their access to foreign borrowing severely curtailed as international lend-
ers cut their exposure to the region. It is noticeable that in spite of the tighten-
ing of credit conditions, very few banks in the new EU countries experienced   13 
life-threatening problems. The main reason for this is arguably the foreign 
ownership of most banks in the region. The owners (typically West European 
banks) of the bank have stood by their affiliates in the region, but avoiding 
excessive withdrawal of fund. In summation, the region as a whole experi-
enced a “sudden stop”, but net capital outflows were limited (ERBD, 2009, 
Ch. 2).  
The global financial crisis affected the real economy in new EU countries 
through two main channels. First, the credit squeeze affected borrowing con-
ditions for firms and households with subsequent adverse effects on domestic 
investment  and  consumption  demand.  Second, the  downturn  in  the  global 
economy, affected export demand severely. The new EU countries are gener-
ally very open economies, having countries in Western Europe as their main 
export markets and the export.  
Table 2 show the real GDP growth in each of the 10 new EU countries 
from 1995 to 2009, where the 2009 data are estimates produced by the Euro-
pean Commission and published in November 2009. Until the outset of the 
global financial crisis, the growth rates in the new EU countries generally ex-
ceeded the EU15 average, reflecting a catch-up process where the new EU 
countries with relatively low initial income levels have been narrowing the 
income gap to the more developed old EU countries. It is noticeable that eco-
nomic growth accelerated in most of the new EU countries in the run-up to 
the EU accession in 2004 or 2007; the prospect of membership instilled con-
fidence among financial markets participants and led to substantial capital in-
flows.  
The (estimated) GDP growth in 2009 is depicted in the last column of 
Table 2. There are substantial differences in output performance across the 10 
countries. The three Baltic States stand out with double-digit GDP falls in 
2009. Poland stands out, but for the opposite reason, namely for maintaining 
positive ￿ albeit limited ￿ economic growth in 2009. The remaining new 
EU countries all exhibit estimated GDP declines ranging from 5 to 8 percent 
in 2009.  
Econometric analyses based on cross-sectional datasets suggest that the 
GDP declines resulting from the global financial crisis were largest in coun-
tries with highly leveraged financial systems and rapid credit growth prior to 
the crisis (Berkmen et al., 2009). A larger share of foreign bank ownership 
appears, however, to have mitigated the GDP decline (Berglof et al., 2009). 
There may also have been a tendency for countries with inflexible exchange 
rate systems and large foreign trade to have suffered larger GDP declines al-
though these results seem to hinge on the particular choice of countries in the 
sample (Berkmen et al., 2009).   
Table 2: Real GDP growth in the 10 new EU countries, 1995–2010, percent per year 
 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009
* 
Bulgaria  ..   –9.4  –5.6  4.0    2.3    5.4  4.1  4.5    5.0  6.6    6.2    6.3    6.2    6.0   –5.9 
Czech Republic  ..  4.0    –0.7   –0.8    1.3    3.6  2.5  1.9    3.6  4.5    6.3    6.8    6.1    2.5   –4.8 
Estonia  2.8  5.7  11.7  6.7  –0.3  10.0  7.5  7.9    7.6  7.2    9.4  10.0    7.2  –3.6  –13.7 
Latvia  0.5  3.6   8.3  4.8    3.3    6.9  8.0  6.5    7.2  8.7  10.6  12.2  10.0  –4.6  –18.0 
Lithuania  ..  5.2   7.5  7.6  –1.1    3.3  6.7  6.9  10.2  7.4    7.8    7.8    9.8    2.8  –18.1 
Hungary  ..  1.0   4.3  5.2    4.2    4.9  4.1  4.4    4.3  4.9    3.5    4.0    1.0    0.6   –6.5 
Poland  ..  6.2   7.1  5.0    4.5    4.3  1.2  1.4    3.9  5.3    3.6    6.2    6.8    5.0     1.2 
Romania  ..  ..  ..  ..  –1.2    2.4  5.7  5.1    5.2  8.5    4.2    7.9    6.3    6.2   –8.0 
Slovenia  6.8  3.6   4.9  3.6    5.4    4.4  2.8  4.0    2.8  4.3    4.5    5.8    6.8    3.5   –7.4 
Slovakia  7.9  6.9   4.4  4.4    0.0    1.4  3.4  4.8    4.7  5.2    6.5    8.5  10.4    6.4   –5.8 
EU15  ..  1.7   2.7  3.0    3.0    3.9  1.9  1.2    1.2  2.3    1.8    3.0    2.6    0.6   –4.1 
Note: 
* Estimates for 2009 from the European Commission’s Autumn Forecast 2009 (EC 2009d). 
Source: Eurostat (2009a), EC (2009d).    15 
The unenviable output performance in 2009 should be seen in light of the 
preceding high growth rates. The Baltic States have, for instance, seen re-
versals of GDP growth from 2007 to 2009 amounting to 20–30 percentage 
points. Other countries have seen reversals during the same time interval of 
the magnitude 5–15 percent points. The downturns are distributed unevenly 
across individuals and are certain to entail substantial social costs in the form 
of higher unemployment and increased poverty rates.  
Figure 3 shows the unemployment rate for each of the 10 countries in 
2007 and 2008 and the estimated unemployment rate for 2009. The unem-
ployment increases in the Baltic States are remarkable, but all countries in the 
region have seen increasing (estimated) unemployment in 2009 and the Euro-
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Figure 3: Unemployment rates, percent of labour force 
Note: 
* Estimates for 2009 from the European Commission’s Autumn Forecast 2009 (EC, 2009d). 
Source: Eurostat (2009d), EC (2009d).    
 
 
4. The short-term fiscal effects 
 
The global financial crisis affected public finances in the new EU coun-
tries in many ways. The main challenge immediately after the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers was the credit squeeze which affected all government bor-
rowing in the region. Data on long-term interest rates are unlikely to give a   16 
full picture as governments simply ceased to issue new debt and to roll over 
existing debt and instead turned to other sources of borrowing such as direct 
borrowing from banks or multilateral lenders like the IMF. An alternative 
measure of the credit market tightness is the cost of issuing against the de-
fault of the borrower through credit default swaps (CDS). Figure 4 shows the 
annual CDS spreads on 5 year government bonds for the new EU countries. 
The CDS spread is a measure of the market’s pricing of the risk that the gov-
ernment will default on the specified bond series within a year, but the meas-
ure should be interpreted with caution as liquidity in many CDS markets is 
very limited.  
The rapid increases in the CDS rates in the autumn 2009 coincides with 
the default of Lehman Brothers and is the result of the “flight to quality” in 
financial markets across the world. It is noticeable, however, that the spreads 
differ across the countries, signifying different assessments of the risk of the 
government defaulting. In the figure, Latvia, Hungary and Poland have the 
highest CDS spreads, while Poland and in particular Slovenia have substan-
tially lower spreads. The CDS spreads have generally tampered since the sec-
ond  quarter  of  2009,  but  remain  substantially  above  the  levels  recorded 
before the global financial crisis broke out.  
The CDS spreads provide a gauge of the financing problems faced by the 
governments in the new EU countries. Hungary and Latvia faced severe liq-
uidity squeezes immediately after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008. 
After relatively short preparations, the two countries received bailouts in the 
form of lending packages arranged and financed by, inter alia, the IMF, the 
European Union and neighbouring countries. Hungary had accumulated sub-
stantial government debt and was as such susceptible to changes in financial 
market sentiments. The conditionality of the programme required the Hun-
garian authorities to take steps to improve the fiscal balance at an early stage. 
The Latvian financing problems emerged in a situation where the government 
debt did not exceed 20 percent of GDP. Refinancing problems had, however, 
led to a collapse of the largest domestically owned bank, Parex Bank, and the 
government had to step in and rescue the bank. The confidence loss was asso-
ciated with increased uncertainty regarding the future path of government fi-
nances as a result of the bailout of Parex Bank and the possibility of further 
problems in the financial sector.  
Continued financial instability, including weakness in non-prime govern-
ment bond markets, induced Romania to seek assistance from the IMF, the 
European Union and other partners at the beginning of 2009. Poland followed 
suit in spring 2009 by being among the first countries to enter a “flexible 
credit line” agreement with the IMF; the credit line is precautionary and only 
to be used in case of deteriorating market sentiments bringing about financial 































































Figure 4: Credit default spreads on 5 year government bonds, percent per 
year, monthly frequency, end of month, Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2009 
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The immediate financing concerns in autumn 2008 and at the beginning of 
2009 were followed by concerns regarding the overall budgetary stance. It is 
noticeable that the direct budgetary impact of the financial crisis has been 
modest in most countries as no major financial sector bailouts have been un-
dertaken, except in Latvia (EC, 2009d: 61). Thus, the impact of the global fi-
nancial crisis on public finances in the 10 new EU countries has primarily 
been indirect through the derived effects on economic activity, interest rates, 
unemployment, etc. The budget developments in the new EU countries are 
discussed in EC (2009b, 2009c)  and Darvas (2009) provides  an  appendix 
listing discretionary expenditures and revenue measures as well as various 
policies to support the financial sector. The treatment below focuses on de-
velopments in the main budget items, i.e. revenues, expenditures and the bud-
get balance.  
As output plummeted at the end of 2008, tax revenues undershot projected 
levels in many  countries, while expenditures did not fall correspondingly. 
Figure 5 shows the general  government revenue as a percent of GDP for 
2007–2009, where the 2009 data are estimates by the European Commission 
based on statistical information from a large part of 2009. (Data for the peri-
od 1995–2009 are available in Table A.1 in Appendix A.) For 2009 the meas-
ure is greatly affected by GDP falling rapidly in almost all countries, which 
“mechanically” increases the government revenues as a percent of GDP if 
real (price deflated) government revenues remain unchanged. We therefore 
also include an adjusted 2009 revenue share, which is computed as the 2009 
revenue share multiplied by one plus the real GDP growth rate for 2009. If 
the price indices of GDP and government revenues coincide, the adjusted 
revenue share is simply the 2009 revenues divided by GDP in 2008. More-
over, the adjusted 2009 revenue share relative to the (unadjusted) revenue 
share for 2008 expresses the relative change in real government revenues.
4 
Thus, in Figure 5, comparing the last column with the second column ex-
poses the development of real government revenues in the 10 new EU coun-
tries from 2008 to 2009. 
 
 
                                                 
4 This is actually valid under the milder assumption that the increases of the two prices 
indices are similar. Use the symbol PR to denote the price index of government revenues, PY 
to denote the price index of GDP, R to denote the real revenues and g to denote the growth 
rate of GDP. The revenues as share of GDP multiplied by one plus the growth rate is then 
[(PR R) /(PY GDP)]·(1 + g). The measure relative to the revenue in the previous period is: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( GDP ) 1 (





























If the price increases of government revenues and GDP coincide, the expression simpli-
fies to R/R(–1), i.e. the real revenues in the current period relative to the real revenues in the 
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Figure 5: General government revenues, percent of GDP, 2007–2009 
Notes: 2009* adj. = general government revenue in 2009 as a percent of GDP in 2008.
* 
Estimates for 2009 from the European Commission’s Autumn Forecast 2009 (EC 2009d). 




Government revenues as a percent of GDP were broadly at the same level 
in the three years under review, with the main exception being Estonia, where 
revenues increased markedly in 2009 as a percent of GDP. Estonia adopted 
aggressive revenue enhancing policies including higher unemployment insur-
ance contributions, divergence of pension contributions from private pension 
accounts to the budget, a higher value added tax rate, higher excise taxes on 
energy, alcohol and tobacco as well as some one-off transfers from state-
owned companies (IMF, 2010). 
The picture is, however, affected by the large GDP falls in most of the 
new EU countries. Comparing the revenue shares for 2008 (second column) 
and the revenues for 2009 as a percent of GDP for 2008 (last striped column), 
it follows that none of the countries sustained the 2008 revenue intake in real 
terms during the crisis year 2009. The real revenue shortfalls were particular-
ly large in Latvia and Lithuania, where the GDP losses were the largest. The 
most striking finding is the fact that Estonia, in spite of an estimated GDP 
loss amounting to 13.7 percent, only saw a small reduction in real revenues 
between 2008 and 2009 (further discussed in Section 5).  
Regarding the government expenditures immediately following the crisis, 
it is noticeable that the direct budgetary costs of the financial crisis in most 
countries have been modest in 2008–2009 mainly because of the ownership   20 
structure  of  the  financial  sectors  in  all  10  countries.  Whereas  bailouts  of 
banks and other financial sector entities have led to substantial direct and in-
direct costs in many west European countries, such costs have been largely 
absent in the new EU countries, with the exception of the bailout of Parex 
Bank in Latvia (EC, 2009d).  
Figure 6 shows the general government expenditures as a percent of GDP 
for the new EU countries for 2007–2009; as before the expenditures for 2009 
are also computed as a share of GDP for 2008. (Data for the period of 1995–
2009 are available in Table A.2 in Appendix A.) All countries in the region 
exhibit increasing expenditures as a percent of GDP from 2008 to 2009 and 
the  increase  is  substantial  for  many  countries.  However,  comparing  the 
change in real expenditures from 2008 to 2009, it follows that most of the 
new EU countries kept government expenditures in real terms largely un-




















Estonia Latvia Lithuania Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia
2007 2008 2009* 2009*  adj.
 
Figure 6: General government expenditures, percent of GDP, 2007–2009 
Notes: 2009* adj. = general government expenditures in 2009 as a percent of GDP in 2008.
* 
Estimates for 2009 from the European Commission’s Autumn Forecast 2009 (EC 2009d).Source: 




                                                 
5 This also includes a number of countries which saw significant increases in the interest 
payments on their public debt, for instance resulting from depreciating currencies and loans 
denominated in foreign currency.    21 
Latvia, Hungary, Romania ￿ and to a lesser extent Estonia ￿ managed to 
reduce the real government expenditures from 2008 to 2009; the first three 
countries were adjusting the budgetary policies as part of the conditionality 
of IMF loans, whereas Estonia sought to bring its fiscal balance into compli-
ance with the deficit criterion of the Maastricht Treaty. The Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovenia saw moderate increases in their real government ex-
penditures resulting from stimulus packages implemented in these countries 
(Darvas, 2009).  
Finally, Figure 7 shows the net effect of the changes in revenues and ex-
penditure discussed above, i.e. the headline consolidated government budget 
balance for 2007–2009. (Data for the period of 1995–2009 are available in 
Table A.3 in Appendix A.) The budget balance worsens in all cases from 
2008 to 2009 and is estimated to exceed 6 percent of GDP for 7 out of the 10 
countries. The deterioration of the budget from 2008 to 2009 is most dramat-
ic for Latvia and Lithuania, but also very substantial for the Czech Republic, 



















Figure 7: Net consolidated government lending, percent of GDP, 2007–2009 
Note: 
* Estimates for 2009 from the European Commission’s Autumn Forecast 2009 (EC 2009d). 




Based on the discussion above, it is possible to divide the 10 new EU 
countries into four “clusters” based on their short-term fiscal policy response 
to the crisis.   22 
￿  The  casualties:  Latvia,  Hungary  and  Romania  encountered  serious  fi-
nancing problems and had to turn to the IMF for support. The countries 
have seen contracting revenues in real terms, but also managed to lower 
real expenditures in 2009. In this group, Hungary has been most success-
ful in curbing the budget deficit. 
￿  The activists: The Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia have 
deficits  of  6–8  percent  of  GDP  in  2009.  The  deficits  are  largely  the 
results  of  relatively  expansionary  expenditure  policies.  The  latter  two 
countries have arguably been aided by their membership of the EMU, 
which  has  helped  reduce  their  exchange  rate  exposures  and  increase 
investor confidence.  
￿  The  hardliners:  Bulgaria  and  Estonia  have  retained  a  high  degree  of 
budgetary discipline and attained budget deficits in 2009 at or below 3 
percent of GDP in spite of substantial GDP declines.  
￿  The outlier: Lithuania is an “outlier” in the sense that it has seen a very 
large GDP fall in 2009, but has still managed to finance its very substan-
tial deficit without turning to the IMF.  
 
 
5. Automatic and discretionary budget reactions 
 
In this section the fiscal policy in the new EU countries is discussed based 
on the estimations of budget reaction functions on data from 1995 to 2008. 
The aim is to assess the sensitivity of the fiscal balance, expenditures and 
revenues to shocks in output growth, and more generally to assess the factors 
driving the headline budgetary measures. The reaction functions are also used 
in Section 6 when the medium-term response to the global financial crisis is 
considered.  
Figure 8 shows simple crossplots of real annual GDP growth in percent 
and the budget balance as a percent of GDP for each of the 10 new EU coun-
tries. The data start in 1995 or nearest year for which data are available and 
end in 2010, where data for 2009 are estimates and data for 2010 forecasts of 
the European Commission (EC, 2009d). Notice that the scales of both the 
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Figure 8: GDP growth and general government budget balance, 1995–2011 
Notes: Black bullets are used for 1995-2008, grey bullets for 2009 estimates and white bullets for 2010 forecasts. Estimates and forecasts are from the 
European Commission’s Autumn Forecast 2009 (EC 2009d). 
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_  25 
Considering the crossplots in Figure 8 for the years 1995–2008 (the black 
bullets), a negative correlation emerges in all cases with the exception of 
Hungary. Higher GDP growth has been associated with an improved budget 
balance in almost all the new EU countries. In a few cases there is an “out-
lier” where the budget discipline has been either lacking (Lithuania, Slov-
enia) or unusually strong (Bulgaria). In general, the overall fiscal balance ap-
pears to be counter-cyclical whether as a result of automatic stabilisers oper-
ating or policy measures induced by the cyclical position.  
As discussed above, the global financial crisis led to exceptional down-
turns in many new EU countries and consequent deterioration of the fiscal 
position. The estimates for 2009 (the grey bullets) and the forecasts for 2010 
(the  white  bullets)  of  the  European  Commission  are  also  included  in  the 
crossplots in Figure 8. For most of the countries the estimates for 2009 and 
the forecasts for 2010 lie close to a hypothetical regression line based on the 
observations for 1995–2008. In other words, the budgetary responses to the 
downturns following the global financial crisis seem to follow previous be-
haviour; for most new EU countries the global financial crisis does not ap-
pear to have led to a major change in fiscal policies.  
The finding of “structurally” unchanged budget reactions has some excep-
tions. In Estonia the budget balance appears to be much stronger in 2009 than 
could be predicted based on the historical pattern. This can be explained by 
several rounds of budget cuts and ￿ in particular ￿ tax increases with the 
aim of keeping the budget deficit below or close to the 3 percent deficit re-
quired to satisfy the Maastricht Treaty’s deficit criterion.
6 The estimated defi-
cit in Hungary is around 4 percent of GDP, which is one of the smallest defi-
cits attained within the sample period 1995–2008. One reason for this is the 
IMF lending programme launched in autumn 2008, which entails condition-
ality  regarding  the  public  finances  of  Hungary.  Slovenia  may  be  another 
country where the deficit is smaller than could be expected given the histori-
cal behaviour.  
The crossplots in Figure 8 show the correlation between GDP growth and 
the budget balance in the new EU countries. The direction of causality is un-
explained, as each of the slopes reflects the net outcome of the effect from 
the business cycle to the budget and from the budget to the business cycle. 
Moreover, omitted factors may help explain the budgetary stance independ-
ently of the cyclical stance.  
One way to capture the effect from the cyclical position to the budget vari-
able is to estimate budget reaction functions with several explanatory variab-
                                                 
6 Latvia, on the other hand, has a deficit in 2009 which is broadly in line with pre-crisis 
behaviour although the very large GDP fall implies that the deficit will be substantial.   26 
les and the business cycle instrumented (Gali and Perotti, 2003; Fatas and 
Mihov, 2001). The lack of data points for the countries individually makes it 
expedient to employ panel data methods to estimate budget reaction func-
tions, basically reflecting the “average” behaviour in the 10 new EU coun-
tries (Staehr, 2008). Figure 8 suggested that the reactions to changes in GDP 
growth exhibit substantial similarities across the 10 countries with Hungary 
being a noticeable exception.  
We estimate models for the overall government budget balance, the prima-
ry balance, the revenues and the expenditures. Each of these dependent budg-
et variables are generally modelled as a linear function of its one-year lagged 
value, the debt stock lagged one year, GDP growth and the unemployment 
rate.
7  The  lagged  dependent  variable  is  included  to  capture  possible  per-
sistence in the budget variable. The lagged debt stock can influence the budg-
et directly as it affects the debt servicing costs and indirectly as it is an im-
portant part of the government’s net asset position. The GDP growth and the 
unemployment variables are included to assess the impact of business cycle 
fluctuations on the budget variables.  
The main purpose of the estimations is to uncover the effect from the busi-
ness cycle position to different aggregate budget measures. This estimated 
effect on the budget variable will generally include both “automatic” adjust-
ment and discretionary policy steps based on the cyclical position. Thus, the 
estimated effect is an aggregate measure based on the outcome of fiscal poli-
cies and not in terms of fiscal policy instruments such as tax rates and dis-
crete spending measures (Kaminsky et al., 2004; Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008). 
The estimation methodology must take into account three main factors. 
First, the estimated models should allow for fixed effects across the country 
dimension, given the simple specification of the dependent variables.  The 
variables reflecting the business cycle, for instance, are not scaled to allow 
for different trend growth or different “natural unemployment” across the 10 
countries. Country fixed effects would mop up such time-invariant hetero-
geneity. Second, the GDP growth and unemployment variables ￿ and to a 
lesser extent the lagged unemployment ￿ will be endogenous with respect to 
the budget variable to the extent that the budget variable affects these variab-
les. Third, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable implies that the esti-
mated coefficients will be subject to the Nickell bias if the model is estimated 
using fixed effects OLS (Nickell, 1981). 
The three estimation issues can be addressed using the Difference GMM 
method developed by Arellano and Bond or the System GMM method devel-
                                                 
7 The data source of the general government primary balance is Eurostat (2009g); the data 
sources of all other variables are provided in Sections 2–4.    27 
oped by Arellano, Bover, Blundell and Bond (Roodman, 2009). Both meth-
ods increase efficiency by making use of “expanding instruments”, i.e. by in-
cluding progressively more lags of the instruments as they become available. 
The System GMM estimator is generally the most efficient of the two esti-
mators, and simulations suggest it performs well even in small panels with a 
low number of cross sections (Soto, 2009).  
Table  3  shows  the  results  of  the  panel  data  estimations  with  different 
budget measures as dependent variable. The estimation sample starts in 1999 
and ends in 2008. The choice of time sample implies that some very large 
deficits for, inter alia, Bulgaria and Lithuania are left out, reducing the risk of 
“outliers” affecting results unduly. 
Column (3.1) shows the results when the budget balance as a percent of 
GDP is the dependent variable. There is substantial persistence in the variable 
although the estimated coefficient of the lagged budget balance is substan-
tially below one. The coefficient of the debt stock is negative but not statisti-
cally significant. The coefficient of contemporaneous GDP is positive and 
around 0.3, while the unemployment rate does not enter with coefficients. It 
is noticeable that the business cycle fluctuations affect the budget balance via 
the growth variable and not in a discernable way via the unemployment vari-
able.
8  
The System GMM estimation method does not allow the direct extraction 
of country-specific fixed effects. We have instead recouped the fixed effects 
from the residuals (which include the fixed effects). The residuals were used 
as the dependent variable in a fixed effect regression with the country fixed 
effects as the only explanatory variables. Positive fixed effects were found 
for Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovenia, while the (numerically) largest negative 





                                                 
8 Even if the growth variable is excluded, the coefficient of the unemployment variable 
remains statistically insignificant (estimation not shown). 
9 The recouped fixed effects from (3.1), in percentage points of GDP, are: Bulgaria 1.5, 
Czech Republic 0.0, Estonia 0.5, Latvia –0.6, Lithuania –0.1, Hungary –0.4, Poland –0.2, 
Romania –0.3, Slovenia 0.8, and Slovakia –0.7.  
Table 3: Estimation of budget reaction functions, 1995–2008 
  (3.1)  (3.2)  (3.3)  (3.4)  (3.5)  (3.6) 
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Debt (–1)  –0.008
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Sample years      1999–2008    1999–2008     1999–2008     1999–2008     1999–2008     1999–2008 
No. of observations  96  100  95  95  95  95 
Notes: Estimation method is One-step System GMM with instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods. White diagonal robust standard errors are shown in round 
brackets; p-values are shown in square brackets. Superscripts 
***, **, * denote that the coefficient estimate is statistically different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level of significance, respectively.   29 
Column (3.2) shows the results when the lagged debt stock and the unem-
ployment rate are left out; the autoregressive coefficient and the coefficient 
of GDP growth are largely unchanged from the more extensive specification 
in (3.1).
10 Column (3.3) exhibits the results when the budget balance as a per-
cent of GDP the previous year is used as dependent variable. The results are 
essentially as those found in (3.1) and it is particularly interesting that the es-
timated coefficient to the GDP variable does not change. Thus, the counter-
cyclicality of the budget balance is not affected by a “denominator effect”, 
where for instance higher contemporaneous GDP growth mechanically re-
duces the (absolute) value of the budget variable (see also Kaminsky et al., 
2004).  
Column (3.4) provides the results when the primary budget balance is used 
as dependent variable. The coefficient of the lagged debt stock is now posi-
tive and statistically significant albeit only at the 10 percent level. Taken at 
face value, the result implies that a permanent increase in the debt stock by 
10 percentage points would improve the primary balance by 0.15 percentage 
points in the short term and around 0.3 percentage points in the longer term. 
These magnitudes appear reasonable and are consistent with the effect of in-
creased debt on the overall budget balance, being insignificant in both sta-
tistical and economic terms.  
Column (3.5) presents the result when the general government revenue as 
a percent of GDP for the previous year is the dependent variable.
11 The vari-
able exhibits substantial persistence as witnessed by the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable being estimated at 0.85. A higher debt stock in-
duces governments to increase the revenue (ostensibly to be able to service 
the debt). GDP growth increases the revenue as a percent of GDP for the 
previous year, i.e. increases the revenue in real terms. A higher unemploy-
ment rate is found to reduce the revenue intake. The latter two results imply 
that the counter-cyclicality of revenues derives from the income and unem-
ployment changes. 
Finally, Column (3.6) shows that government expenditures exhibit sub-
stantial persistence. They are, unsurprisingly, a positive function of the debt 
stock. The estimated coefficient of GDP growth variable is negative, indi-
cating counter-cyclical expenditures, but it is small and statistically insignifi-
cant.  Moreover,  the  unemployment  rate  enters  with  a  negative  sign,  indi-
cating that higher unemployment leads to lower government expenditures. 
                                                 
10 The results are reasonably robust to sample changes. For instance, the qualitative re-
sults obtained in (3.1) are essentially unchanged if the sample is shortened to include only a 
few years (estimations not shown). 
11 See the discussion of Figure 5 in Section 4 for the definition and interpretation of the 
variable.    30 
This surprising result may be an aberration but it may also reflect that a gov-
ernment in a downturn with increasing unemployment reduces expenditures. 
In combination, the results suggest a weak or non-existent counter-cyclicality 
in the government expenditures of the new EU countries.  
The analyses in this section entail important findings, which we will use in 
the discussion of the medium-term fiscal policy challenges emerging from 
the  global  financial  crisis.  The  budget  balance  exhibits  substantial  per-
sistence, implying that changes to the balance may be long-lived. Budget def-
icits following a negative GDP growth shock may persist after the impulse 
triggering the deficit has vanished, even when controlling for an increased ac-
cumulated debt. The debt stock has no discernible effect on the overall gov-
ernment budget balance, but higher debt improves the primary balance. The 
budget balance is moderately counter-cyclical. Furthermore, the counter-cy-
clicality of the budget balance primarily originates from the revenue side of 
the budget, while the expenditure side might be a-cyclical or even pro-cycli-
cal.  
 
6. Fiscal policy and management in the medium term 
 
It is clear from the findings in Sections 4 and 5 that future macroeconomic 
developments will play a major role regarding the outlook of public finances 
in the region (see also  Wolf, 2009). This follows from the regressions in 
Table 3 (based on data for 1999 to 2008), which suggest that 1 percentage 
point higher growth improved the budget balance in an “average” new EU 
country by 0.3 percentage points within the same year.  
We begin by computing a hypothetical benchmark scenario for the general 
government balance for the three years 2009–2011. It should be underscored 
that this hypothetical benchmark does not amount to a forecast or, for that 
matter,  the  most  probable  scenario.  The  purpose  is  entirely  to  establish  a 
benchmark,  against  which  the  impact  of  a  number  of  factors  can  be  dis-
cussed. 
We use the regression in Column (3.2) in Table 3 to compute scenarios for 
the budget balance in each new EU country, based on the GDP growth pro-
jections  from  the  European  Commission’s  Autumn  Forecast  2009  (EC, 
2009d). The forecasted GDP growth rate is on average –0.3 percent for 2010 
(ranges from –4 to 1.9 percent) and 2.8 percent for 2011 (ranges from 2 to 4.2 
percent). The estimation in Column (3.2) assumes country-specific fixed ef-
fects, but common coefficients of the lagged dependent variable and the GDP 
growth rate. Figure 8 shows the hypothetical benchmark scenarios based on 
dynamic forecasting of the budget balance for 2009–2011 and also the esti-  31 
mated budget balance for 2009 from the Autumn Forecast 2009 of the Euro-
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Figure 8: General government budget balance, percent of GDP, hypothetical 
benchmark scenarios 2009-11, European Commission forecast 20 
Notes: 2009* denotes the budget balance estimates of the European Commission’s Autumn 
Forecast 2009 (EC, 2009d). 
Sources: Eurostat (2009b), own calculations. 
 
 
Comparing the hypothetical benchmark scenarios and the EC estimates for 
2009, it is clear that there is a substantial congruence between the benchmark 
scenarios based on dynamic forecasting using (3.2) and the estimates from 
the European Commission. This is partly the result of having used the GDP 
growth estimates of the European Commission, but it also illustrates that a 
simple specification of the budget reaction function can provide guidance re-
garding future budgetary outcomes.  
There are some interesting exceptions for 2009, where the budget deficit 
of the benchmark scenario exceeds the deficit according to the EC estimate. 
This is the case for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Hungary. The discrepancies 
can be attributed to the discretionary fiscal consolidation measures under-
taken by these countries in order to improve their fiscal situation in 2009. The 
differences between the EC estimates and the  benchmark scenario signify 
that the benchmark scenarios are based on unchanged budget reaction func-
tions, while in actuality these countries tightened their budget balance as part 
of IMF conditionality (Latvia, Hungary) or to strengthen the credibility of   32 
their currency boards (Bulgaria, Estonia). The differences between the bench-
mark scenarios and the EC estimates provide a rough measure of the discre-
tionary fiscal tightening undertaken. It is noticeable that the budget balance 
according to the benchmark scenario is lower than the EC estimate for Po-
land; this reflects the discretionary loosening of fiscal policy undertaken in 
Poland at an early stage of the crisis.  
Regarding the years 2010–2011, the hypothetical benchmark scenario sug-
gests that the budget balance will remain in negative territory in all new EU 
countries. The benchmark scenario relies on dynamic forecasting so that, for 
instance, the budget balance forecast for 2010 is computed using the budget 
balance  in  the  scenario  for  2009.  The  2010–2011  scenarios  are  therefore 
likely  to  overstate  the  deficits  for  the  countries  that  undertook  substantial 
fiscal tightening in 2009, i.e. Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary.
12  
In the benchmark scenario, the average budget deficit in the 10 new EU 
countries amounts to around 6 percent of GDP in 2010 and 2011. This should 
be seen against the background of forecast average GDP growth of –0.3 per-
cent in 2010 and 2.8 percent in 2011. If growth turns out to be below the 
forecasts, the resulting budget deficits will likely be larger. Deficits of 6 per-
cent of GDP or larger combined with low or negative growth would lead to 
rapidly increasing debt-to-GDP ratios.  
In sum; the global financial crisis has both in the short and medium term 
led to a substantial deterioration in the fiscal balance, which in some coun-
tries has been partly counteracted by fiscal tightening. The main issue is to 
which extent the crisis and the accompanying deterioration of the budget has 
jeopardised fiscal sustainability. It is beyond the scope of this paper to set out 
explicit scenarios for the debt dynamics, but a number of factors affecting fis-
cal  sustainability  in  the  short  term  and  in  the  medium  term  will  be  dis-
cussed.
13 
Given that most of the new EU countries, with the exception of Hungary 
and Poland, entered the global financial crisis with low debt stocks, the main 
short term problem relates to the financing of the budget, i.e. the roll-over of 
existing public debt and the issuance of new debt to cover budget deficits. 
The experiences of Latvia and Romania show that liquidity problems result-
ing from sudden stops of government financing can emerge at low levels of 
debt. 
                                                 
12 The forecasts of the budget balance in percent of GDP published in the Autumn Fore-
cast 2009 of the European Commission are, for 2010 and 2011 respectively: Bulgaria –1.2 
and –0.4, Czech Republic –5.5 and –5.7, Estonia –3.2 and –3.0, Latvia –12.3 and –12.2, 
Lithuania –9.2 and –9.7, Hungary –4.2 and –3.9, Poland –7.5 and –7.6, Romania –6.8 and  
–5.9, Slovenia –7.0 and –6.9, Slovakia –6.0 and –5.5 (EC, 2009d).  
13 EC (2009d, Ch. 3) provides debt to GDP scenarios until 2010 for all 27 EU countries.   33 
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact factors that affect the probably of sud-
den stops in the case of the new EU countries. Kaminsky et al. (2004) show 
that capital flows to emerging markets tend to be pro-cyclical. This feature 
may complicate financial management if the result also holds for the new EU 
countries: a (renewed) economic downturn increases the need for public bor-
rowing while at the same time impedes public borrowing.  
The global financial crisis has underscored the importance of external fac-
tors. Renewed disruptions in financial markets in high income economies are 
likely to affect the government debt markets in the new EU countries dispro-
portionately. Large deficits and high debt stocks arguably leave the new EU 
countries  exposed  to  instability  emerging  in  European  or  global  financial 
markets. This may be of particular importance for countries outside the Euro-
zone and therefore do not benefit from the absence of currency risk (against 
the euro).  
In the medium term fiscal sustainability is to a large extent dependent on 
the evolvement of the debt as a share of GDP. More specifically, sustaina-
bility requires that the debt servicing costs remain below a level which is 
deemed acceptable by the policy-makers. Large government deficits and in-
creasing debt ratios are potentially also a problem in the medium term, be-
yond 2011. The deficits need to be financed and the increasing debt stocks 
need to be refinanced on a continuous basis. It is frequently found that in-
vestors “tolerate” much less debt in emerging market economies than in high-
income economies, so that sovereign debt crisis frequently appear at relative-
ly low debt levels in emerging market economies (Sturzenegger and Zettel-
meyer, 2006).  
An important problem relates to the challenges associated with forecasting 
trend growth in the new EU countries in the medium term, i.e. during the 
next 3–8 years (IMF, 2009, Ch. 4). There are three main possibilities: a) The 
crisis will be long-lasting, implying medium-term growth rates to remain un-
stable and at low levels; b) Medium-term economic growth rates will return 
to the levels recorded prior to the global financial crisis, which implies rapid 
convergence,  possibly  based  on  renewed  capital  inflows;  c)  Medium-term 
growth will remain substantially below the previous levels, given the eco-
nomic restructuring and reduced capital inflows. Experiences from previous 
crises suggest that all three possibilities are likely.  
The estimation of budget reaction functions in Section 5 suggested that 
government expenditures were a-cyclical or even pro-cyclical. The global fi-
nancial crisis has, however, led to extraordinarily large downturns of GDP 
growth with subsequent negative effects on employment and unemployment 
in most new EU countries. The possibility of increasing social problems may   34 
add an element of uncertainty with respect to the ability of governments to 
tighten fiscal policies.  
As noted in Section 4, the direct budgetary costs in support of the financial 
sector have been modest because the financial sector has held up well in most 
of the new EU countries. Governments in some countries might, however, 
end up taking over liabilities from the private sector, which would weaken 
public finances. First, problems could emerge in the financial sector in the 
medium term if the downturn becomes protracted and borrowers default on 
their obligations. Second, there may be political pressure to support borrow-
ers who face problems with servicing their debt, for instance households that 
may default on housing debt. Third, there may be attempts to support ailing 
firms, as has happened in, for instance, old EU countries.  
The estimation of budget reaction functions in Section 4 suggested that the 
primary balance reacted very modestly to the debt stock, while the overall 
government budget balance did not react in a discernible way.  If this be-
haviour remains unchanged, the rapid increases in debt as a share of GDP in 
2009 and beyond may be protracted, as there is limited feedback from the 
debt stock to the fiscal balance.  
There are, however, also a number of factors which contribute to reduced 
pressure on the public finances and point towards a benign development path 
in the medium term. First, the IMF-led financing packages to 3 of the 10 new 
EU countries appeared from the second half of 2009 to have stabilised fi-
nancial markets and given the governments space to revise their fiscal poli-
cies and management in an orderly manner.
14 The support packages might 
also have reduced the financing pressure on the countries that have not re-
ceived the loans. Second, the new EU countries will continue to receive sub-
stantial  support  from  the  Structural  and  Cohesion  Funds  of  the  European 
Union, which to a large extent will be channel through the budget as reve-
nues.
15 The support may allow governments to cut other expenditure items 
and thus improve the budget balance. Moreover, an effective utilisation of the 
resources from the EU may stimulate economic growth which may help facil-




                                                 
14 The IMF also provided a financing facility to Poland, but the facility is precautionary 
and Poland had not drawn on the facility at the time of writing in January 2010.  
15 In the case of Estonia, the projected net transfers from the EU amounts to 5.4 percent 
of GDP in 2009 and 7.0 percent of GDP in 2010 (IMF, 2010: 12).    35 
7. Final comments  
 
This paper has discussed the development of public finances in the 10 new 
EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe since the global financial cri-
sis broke out in 2008. The financial turmoil spread in a short time to the new 
EU countries and impeded government borrowing in the region. Credit De-
fault Swap spreads shot up, signifying that financial markets had reduced 
appetite for risk and assessed default risks to have increased in the region. 
Facing imminent financing problems, Hungary and Latvia had to turn to the 
IMF in autumn 2008; Romania followed suit at the beginning of 2009.  
The direct budgetary costs of the financial crisis have been modest, except 
in Latvia where a domestic bank was bailed out in the autumn 2008. Else-
where the mainly foreign-owned banks and financial institutions have been 
kept afloat by their owners. The impact of the global financial crisis on the 
fiscal situation has, thus, primarily been indirect via economic growth and 
other variables. All new EU countries, with the exception of Poland, are esti-
mated to have experienced substantial output falls in 2009. The Baltic coun-
tries are in a unique situation with estimated output falls between 13 and 18 
percent.  
Given the growth setback, it is unsurprising that fiscal balances deterio-
rated in the new EU countries in 2009. Four different country clusters were 
identified based on their fiscal performance in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis breaking out in autumn 2008. The casualties comprise Latvia, 
Hungary and Romania, which had to turn to the IMF for support and which 
subsequently have directed their fiscal policies towards satisfying the loan 
conditionalities. The activists include the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia, which have followed relatively expansionary (Keynesian-in-
spired) policies. The hardliners are Bulgaria and Estonia, which have main-
tained a tight fiscal stance. Finally, the outlier refers to Lithuania, which has 
managed to finance substantial deficits during the crisis without having to 
turn to the IMF.  
The  estimations  of  budget  reaction  functions  revealed  that  the  general 
budget balance has been moderately counter-cyclical, but also that this coun-
ter-cyclicality derives entirely from the revenue side. The estimations suggest 
that if the global financial crisis has, on average, caused a reduction of output 
growth in the new EU countries equal to 10 percentage points in 2009, this 
has entailed an average worsening of the budget balance by 3 percentage 
points  or  more  in  2009  (and  with  substantial  persistence  in  the  following 
years). 
The medium-term budget outlook rests to a large extent on the growth out-
look.  If  growth  returns  to  pre-crisis  levels,  budget  balances  will  improve   36 
rapidly and debt as a share of GDP will stabilise or fall. If the crisis is pro-
tracted and leads to low or zero growth in the medium term, budget deficits 
will remain large and the financing of the debt will be jeopardised. It was un-
derscored that it is very difficult to produce reliable medium-term growth 
forecasts. Moreover, the budgetary situation is subject to a number of addi-
tional factors, which may affect the budget balance in negative direction.  
The  upshot  is  that  a  number  of  the  new  EU  countries  would  need  to 
tighten fiscal policies in the medium-term in order to improve the budget bal-
ance and reduce financial vulnerabilities. Such an improvement of the struc-
tural balance is particularly pertinent, given the unsettled situation in world 
financial and goods markets. A more counter-cyclical fiscal stance may also 
be beneficial, in part to ensure that a future upturn is used to consolidate 
public finances. In this context, it may be particularly important to consider 
steps seeking to avoid a-cyclicality or pro-cyclicality in government expendi-
tures.  
The management of public finances plays an important role in the imple-
mentation of measures aimed at improving the structural balance and ensur-
ing country-cyclicality. It may be beneficial to establish new institutions and 
governance structures if the ambitious objectives are to be realised. The gov-
ernments in the new EU countries may, for instance, consider setting up “sta-
bilisation  funds”,  as  those  increasingly  used  in  countries  exporting  oil  or 
other export goods with highly fluctuating prices.
16 Pre-accumulated public 
funds may make the countries less dependent on international financing con-
ditions. Strengthened budgetary institutions and the introduction of fiscal pol-
icy rules may also facilitate the adjustment required in many of the new EU 
countries. Along the same lines, Fabrizio and Mody (2008) suggest that a 
strengthening of fiscal management and budgetary institutions can contribute 
to improved budgetary outcomes in several European countries. 
The normative discussion above raises the question under which condi-
tions such changes of public finance management and institutions may occur. 
The  encouraging  conclusion  in  Fabrizio  and  Mody  (2008)  is  that  large 
shocks, such as deep economic crises, in the past have been instrumental in 
bringing about changes in fiscal management and institutions, possibly be-
cause the scarcity of resources changes the power of different political con-
stituencies. The global financial crisis, which in the short term has strained 
public  finances  in  the  new  EU  countries,  may  thus  in  the  medium  term 
                                                 
16 Kamps et al. (2009) report data on the transfers from the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds to each of the new EU countries (except Slovenia). They estimate that the transfers 
each year during the period 2010–2013 will amount to 2–3 percent of the recipient countries’ 
GDP. The lower GDP growth in most of the new EU countries, resulting from the global 
financial crisis, implies that the transfers as percent of  GDP will be somewhat larger than 
these estimates.    37 
function as a catalyst for changes in fiscal management and lay the ground 
for future adjustment of the budget stance.   38 
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Appendix A: Headline budgetary figures for the new EU countries 
 
Table A.1: General government revenues, percent of GDP, 1995–2009 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009* 
Bulgaria  ..  ..  ..  40.6  42.0  42.2  40.9  39.5  40.0  41.3  41.2  39.5  41.5  39.1  38.7 
Czech Republic  41.0  39.3  39.4  38.2  38.6  38.1  38.7  39.5  40.7  42.2  41.4  41.1  41.9  40.9  40.3 
Estonia  42.4  39.1  39.6  38.5  36.7  35.9  34.7  36.0  36.5  35.6  35.2  36.3  37.4  37.1  41.9 
Latvia  37.0  36.5  37.5  40.2  37.9  34.6  32.5  33.4  33.2  34.7  35.1  37.7  35.5  34.6  34.9 
Lithuania  32.9  33.1  37.9  37.1  37.1  35.9  33.2  32.9  31.9  31.8  32.8  33.1  33.8  34.2  36.1 
Hungary  46.9  46.3  43.7  43.0  43.3  43.8  43.2  42.3  42.2  42.3  42.2  42.6  44.8  45.5  45.9 
Poland  43.3  46.1  41.8  40.1  40.4  38.1  38.6  39.2  38.4  36.9  39.4  40.2  40.3  39.6  37.6 
Romania  33.8  30.9  30.5  32.0  34.8  33.8  32.5  33.0  32.0  32.3  32.3  33.1  33.5  32.8  31.6 
Slovenia  44.3  43.3  42.5  43.3  43.4  43.0  43.6  43.9  43.7  43.6  43.8  43.2  42.4  42.4  43.2 
Slovakia  45.2  43.8  42.6  40.5  40.7  39.9  38.0  36.8  37.4  35.3  35.2  33.5  32.5  32.5  31.3 
EU15  45.2  45.9  45.9  45.7  46.1  45.8  45.1  44.5  44.5  44.3  44.8  45.2  45.3  45.1  .. 
Note: 
* Estimates for 2009 from the European Commission’s Autumn Forecast 2009 (EC 2009d). 
Source: Eurostat (2009e), EC (2009d).  
Table A.2: General government expenditures, percent of GDP, 1995–2009 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009* 
Bulgaria  ..  ..  ..  39.3  41.8  42.6  40.3  40.3  40.3  39.7  39.3  36.5  41.5  37.3  39.5 
Czech Republic  54.5  42.6  43.2  43.2  42.3  41.8  44.4  46.3  47.3  45.1  45.0  43.8  42.6  43.0  46.9 
Estonia  41.3  39.5  37.4  39.2  40.1  36.1  34.8  35.8  34.8  34.0  33.6  34.0  34.8  39.9  44.8 
Latvia  38.6  36.9  36.3  40.2  41.8  37.3  34.6  35.6  34.8  35.8  35.6  38.2  35.9  38.8  43.8 
Lithuania  34.4  36.4  49.6  40.1  39.9  39.1  36.8  34.7  33.2  33.3  33.3  33.6  34.8  37.4  45.9 
Hungary  55.6  50.6  49.2  50.4  48.4  46.9  47.3  51.2  49.4  48.7  50.1  52.0  49.8  49.2  50.0 
Poland  47.7  51.0  46.4  44.3  42.7  41.1  43.8  44.2  44.6  42.6  43.4  43.9  42.2  43.3  44.0 
Romania  35.9  34.7  34.9  35.2  39.2  38.5  36.0  35.0  33.5  33.5  33.5  35.3  36.0  38.4  39.4 
Slovenia  52.6  44.5  44.8  45.7  46.5  46.7  47.6  46.3  46.4  45.8  45.2  44.5  42.4  44.2  49.5 
Slovakia  48.6  53.7  49.0  45.8  48.1  52.2  44.5  45.0  40.1  37.6  38.0  36.9  34.4  34.8  37.5 
EU15  52.4  50.1  48.5  47.5  47.0  45.4  46.4  46.8  47.5  47.1  47.2  46.6  46.0  47.3  .. 
Note: 
* Estimates for 2009 from the European Commission’s Autumn Forecast 2009 (EC 2009d). 
Source: Eurostat (2009b), EC (2009d).  
Table A.3: Net consolidated government lending, percent of GDP, 1995–2009 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009* 
Bulgaria    –3.4  –1.8  5.3  1.3  0.2  –0.3  0.6  –0.8  –0.3  1.6  1.9  3.0  0.1  1.8  –0.8 
Czech Republic  –13.4  –3.3  –3.8  –5.0  –3.7  –3.7  –5.6  –6.8  –6.6  –2.9  –3.6  –2.6  –0.7  –2.1  –6.6 
Estonia  1.1  –0.4  2.2  –0.7  –3.5  –0.2  –0.1  0.3  1.7  1.6  1.6  2.3  2.6  –2.7  –3.0 
Latvia  –1.6  –0.4  1.1  0.0  –3.9  –2.8  –2.1  –2.3  –1.6  –1.0  –0.4  –0.5  –0.3  –4.1  –9.0 
Lithuania  –1.5  –3.2  –11.7  –3.0  –2.8  –3.2  –3.6  –1.9  –1.3  –1.5  –0.5  –0.4  –1.0  –3.2  –9.8 
Hungary  –8.7  –4.3  –5.5  –7.4  –5.1  –3.0  –4.1  –8.9  –7.2  –6.4  –7.9  –9.4  –5.0  –3.7  –4.1 
Poland  –4.4  –4.9  –4.6  –4.3  –2.3  –3.0  –5.1  –5.0  –6.3  –5.7  –4.1  –3.6  –1.9  –3.7  –6.4 
Romania  –2.1  –3.7  –4.5  –3.2  –4.4  –4.7  –3.5  –2.0  –1.5  –1.2  –1.2  –2.2  –2.5  –5.5  –7.8 
Slovenia  –8.4  –1.1  –2.4  –2.4  –3.0  –3.7  –4.0  –2.5  –2.7  –2.2  –1.4  –1.3  0.0  –1.8  –6.3 
Slovakia  –3.4  –9.9  –6.3  –5.3  –7.4  –12.3  –6.5  –8.2  –2.8  –2.4  –2.8  –3.5  –1.9  –2.3  –6.3 
EU15  –7.2  –4.2  –2.6  –1.8  –0.9  0.4  –1.2  –2.4  –3.0  –2.8  –2.4  –1.3  –0.7  –2.2  .. 
Note: 
* Estimates for 2009 from the European Commission’s Autumn Forecast 2009 (EC 2009d). 
Source: Eurostat (2009f), EC (2009d).  
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